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abstract
during the last several decades research in social behavior has allowed to 
differentiate at least two different types of interactions: cooperation and com-
petition. Specifically, several attempts have been made to predict and explain 
cooperative behavior. Typically, it has been studied using artificial situations 
(e.g. azrin & lindsley, 1956; cohen & lindsley, 1964; lindsley, 1966; Mithaug 
& Burgess, 1967, 1968; schmitt, 1987; schmitt & Marwell, 1968; shimoff & 
Matthews, 1975), being the most typical matrix games like the Prisoner’s 
dilemma, but recent studies have incorporated more naturalistic situations. 
following the research initiated by Ribes-iñesta (Ribes-iñesta, 2001; Ribes-
iñesta & Rangel, 2002) we show how a computerized puzzle-solving task can 
be used to improve our knowledge of dyadic interactions, as minimal settings 
representative of social behavior. in three studies, the candidates for a job 
position could cooperate or not cooperate with another candidate by helping 
with the other’s puzzles. Results show that the behaviors could be classified 
in three groups: non-cooperation, graded cooperation, and systematic coop-
eration. these behavioral tendencies were highly consistent throughout the 
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task and reasonably stable after a one-year interval. their distribution is not 
independent of gender; females show a higher frequency of non-cooperative 
behavior than of systematic cooperation, whereas males show the reverse. 
these results are in accordance with recent reports in the literature (e.g. Kurz-
ban & houser, 2001). as previous studies, we demonstrate that the tendency 
to cooperate is influenced by the cooperative tendency of the others.
Key words: social behavior, cooperation, dyadic interaction, prisoner’s 
dilemma
resumen
la investigación realizada en el ámbito del estudio de la conducta social ha 
permitido diferenciar, cuando menos, dos tipos diferentes de interacción, a 
saber, conducta cooperativa vs. competitiva. Más específicamente, un buen 
número de estudios se han centrado en el estudio de los factores que per-
miten predecir y explicar la conducta de cooperación. habitualmente estos 
estudios se han servido del uso de situaciones de experimentación artificiales 
(e.g. azrin & lindsey, 1956; cohen & lindsey, 1964; lindsey, 1966; Mithaug 
& Burgess, 1967, 1968; schmitt, 1987; schmitt & Marwell, 1968; shimoff & 
Matthews, 1975), como por ejemplo el dilema del prisionero. sin embargo, 
estudios más recientes han hecho uso de situaciones con mayor validez eco-
lógica. a partir de lo estudios descritos por Ribes-iñesta (Ribes-iñesta, 2001; 
Ribes-iñesta & Rangel, 2002), se desarrolló una tarea por computadora (rom-
pecabezas) para el estudio de interacciones sociales diádicas. se presentan 
tres estudios en los que una muestra de candidatos a un puesto de traba-
jo podían elegir entre cooperar o no hacerlo con su compañero en la tarea 
de resolución del rompecabezas. los resultados muestran que es posible 
clasificar a los participantes en tres grupos: no cooperadores, cooperadores 
graduales y cooperadores sistemáticos. estos patrones de interacción fue-
ron altamente consistentes durante la tarea y razonablemente estables tras 
un año de evaluación. sin embargo, se observó un efecto del sexo de los 
participantes, de tal suerte que las mujeres mostraron una mayor frecuencia 
de patrones de no cooperación que de cooperación sistemática, de manera 
opuesta a la tendencia que se observó en los varones. estos resultados son 
coherentes con resultados recientes (e.g. Kurzban & houser, 2001). asimis-
mo, de manera coincidente con otros trabajos, se observa que la tendencia a 
cooperar de los participantes se ve modulada por la tendencia a cooperarar 
de sus compañeros.
Palabras clave: conducta social, cooperación, interacción diádica, dilema del 
prisionero.
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the research on social behavior developed during the last several decades 
has allowed differentiating between two types of interaction: cooperation and 
competition. nevertheless, major research has focused over the study of co-
operation and competition interactions.
cooperation and competition have been initially treated as contrasting 
alternatives, in such a way that the former implies benefits for others, whereas 
competition implies the opposite, to gain advantage over them. however, to-
day, at least from the experimental analysis of behavior and specifically in 
the operant tradition, both interactions are considered as specific instances 
sharing the property of consequence interdependence - each person’s con-
sequences depend on the behavior of another. other’s behavior typically be-
comes discriminative stimuli that influences how each person responds. So, 
other’s behavior is treated as the antecedent stimulus of the own responses. 
Typically, in a dyadic interaction under cooperation contingencies, a specific 
other’s response followed by a complementary response of the subject, is the 
necessary criteria to get the reinforcement for both of them. in this frame, “a 
person’s behavior is social when its causes or effects include the behavior of 
others” (schmitt, 1998).
taking that into account, cooperation and competition are behaviors that 
occur in the context of particular contingencies that specify behaviors and the 
criteria for their reinforcement. When cooperative contingencies operate, all 
participants receive a reinforcer if their responses collectively meet a specified 
performance criterion. opposite, under competitive contingencies, reinforcers 
are distributed unequally based on relative performance (schmitt, 1998).
in the present studies our interest is concerned with social behavior un-
der cooperative contingencies. so, neither competitive contingencies nor ex-
change contingencies will be addressed in this paper.
following hake and vukelich (1972) a cooperation procedure is charac-
terized by two essential aspects: 1) the reinforcers of both individuals are at 
least in part dependent upon the responses of the other individual, and 2) the 
procedure allows such responses, designated as cooperative responses to 
result in an equitative division of responses and reinforcers.
an important factor in cooperative settings is the availability of alternative 
responses to cooperation (schmitt, 1998). so, three types of cooperation are 
differentiated (Hake & Vukelich, 1972). The first one called forced cooperation 
refers to those situations in which cooperation represents the only possibility 
to get the reinforcer. different contingencies operate when there is more than 
one alternative response to get the reinforcer, and the individual can choose 
between them. such settings are called alternative response or choice situa-
tion. But the most used alternative is that in which there is just one individual 
response that provides a source of reinforcement, and does not depend on 
the behavior of the others. this is a single alternative to cooperation.
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hake and vukelich (1972) classify cooperation research in two major 
categories: performance procedures and choice procedures. The first one 
measures the behavior that occurs during a cooperative interaction. choice 
procedures are not interested in cooperative behavior itself, but just in the op-
tions selected, to cooperate or not, independently of the behavior required to 
make the choice.
from both approximations, performance and choice procedures, experi-
mental approaches to the study of cooperation has been developed through 
the analysis of minimal social settings. such studies typically involve two 
subjects interacting in a dyadic situation. Artificial situations have been tradi-
tionally developed for the study of cooperation (e.g. azrin & lindsley, 1956; 
cohen & lindsley, 1964; lindsley, 1966; Mithaug & Burgess, 1967, 1968; 
schmitt, 1987; schmitt & Marwell, 1968; shimoff & Matthews, 1975). the 
most frequent artificial setting to study cooperation (and other forms of social 
behavior) has been the Prisoner’s dilemma (Pd).
in the Pd two persons have simultaneously to make a choice between 
four alternatives of responses being ignorant of the partner’s choice. each 
one of the alternatives has associated a reward for the person (points) that 
make the choice and for the partner. the outcome and points awarded are 
announced after each trial. the points obtained for each person are based 
on the other’s behavior. see schmitt (1998) for a detailed characterization of 
each alternative and the procedure to compute points for each partner.
several aspects we would like to consider about Pd. first at all, the mo-
tivation to cooperate is only one of the several factors that could affect sub-
jects’ choices. each subject can choose between cooperate or not cooperate 
with the partner. second, in Pd the alternative to cooperate is not a simple 
individual alternative: cooperation requires mutual reinforcement for some re-
sponses. Both subjects must choice the cooperation alternative to be consid-
ered that cooperation occurs. so, cooperation requires the agreement of both 
subjects to cooperate. third, is essential to highlight that in iterated versions 
of this setting it has been shown that there is no best strategy as such. it 
depends on the composition of strategies in the population (alexander, 1974, 
au & Komorita, 2002). thus, in a population of cooperative individuals the 
best strategy is to cooperate, even though at the individual level the expected 
value is higher for non-cooperative behavior (axelrod, 1984; Macy, 1995).
there are many situations in real life with Pd-like scenarios. thus, in the 
world of labor, cooperation with partners usually involves a benefit for the 
company, but it can produce a loss for the individual, as he/she cooperates 
with someone who competes for receiving personal rewards. similarly, in con-
texts of personnel selection with several job positions available, cooperation 
with a rival can be seen as an efficient strategy. At first glance, helping a rival 
could be seen as negative; however, the paradox is solved if we consider that 
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helping others could have as a consequence that the other returns the favor, 
so that such behaviors can be beneficial for both.
the use of simulated partners has been a common experimental proce-
dure to study cooperation behavior in the last years, specially when the inter-
est has been focused over particular strategies in a social relation (Marwell & 
schmitt, 1975; shimoff & Matthews, 1975; dougherty & cherek, 1994; Molm, 
1998, 1990; spiga, cherek, grabowsky & Bennett, 1992). how can we avoid 
possible collateral effects of using simulated subjects? that is, how can we 
persuade subjects that the partner is real? Recently studies prove that people 
increasingly interact with computers in a human like manner (Kiesler, sproull 
& Walters, 1996), and that there are no major differences in performance 
when real or simulated partners are used.
in agreement with other authors (Ribes-iñesta, 2001, Ribes-iñesta & 
Rangel, 2002), we think that the studies of cooperation revised (hake and 
vukelich, 1972; schmitt, 1998) from an operant perspective has been too 
restrictive. first at all, more valid tools are necessary to study cooperative 
behavior. in real life, it is not necessary “to discover” a response that in com-
bination with the other’s responses get the reinforcement for us. usually we 
choose between cooperate or no cooperate with others by virtue of our own 
style or specific mode to address our behavior. From a more intuitive ap-
proach, it is possible to consider that a person is cooperating with any partner 
when he/she make something useful to get a common goal. But it is indepen-
dent of the partner’s behavior. you can cooperate with your partner in spite 
of that he/she cooperates or not with you. So, we believe that cooperative 
behavior is not necessarily bidirectional, as it is considered from the oper-
ant behavior perspective that we exposed previously. Moreover, experimental 
situations developed must allow the subject to choose between cooperating 
or not. We believe that both options should be equally valid to solve the task, 
in such a way that just the subject’s personal tendencies and no other factors 
should guide his/her behavior.
taking that into account, Ribes-iñesta (2001) developed a suitable task 
to study social behavior under these requirements. this preparation involves 
two explicit participants in a dyadic interaction through two computers inter-
connected (in the same room or in separate rooms). the screens of both 
monitors show two visual puzzles, one in the left section of the screen and 
other in the right section. each subject has to complete the puzzle in the left 
section of his/her computer. In the right section of each screen appears the 
partner’s puzzle. each subject can choose between putting or not pieces in 
the puzzle of the right section. Both puzzles can be the same or different (see 
Ribes-iñesta (2001), Ribes-iñesta and Rangel (2002) for a detailed descrip-
tion). in this setting the participants can choose between to cooperate or not. 
no prescriptions are setup regarding desirable behavior. to cooperate implies 
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to put a piece in the partner’s puzzle, and the subjects must choose between 
to solve the puzzle in a personal form or to cooperate with the partner.
We have modified this preparation for studying the behavior of “coopera-
tion with a competitor”. Participants in the three studies reported below are 
candidates for entry to a preparatory course for a job, so that the others are 
competitors for the same good. Below the candidate’s puzzle there is anoth-
er puzzle that supposedly corresponds to another candidate. the candidate 
can help the virtual partner and the virtual partner can help the candidate. 
Both, moving pieces correctly in the own puzzle or in the partner’s puzzle 
produces to get points. although the ratio between candidates and positions 
is high (30:1), the number of positions is still high (24). as a consequence, 
the fact that the partner reaches his/her goal does not reduce significantly 
the candidate’s opportunities. in short, it is a situation in which the subject 
can choose to cooperate or not to cooperate with a competitor, knowing that 
mutual cooperation implies a mutual benefit. See later a detailed review of the 
experimental setting.
it is a choice situation in which each one of the subjects must select to co-
operate with the partner, collaborating with him/her in terminate his/her puzzle, 
or not cooperate, just completing his/her puzzle and then ending the session. 
We are not interested in the study of the cooperative behavior by itself, but 
in getting global tendencies of responses as a first step approximating de-
tailed knowledge of social interactions. so, we do not address individualized 
analyses, but we adopt a global approximation in which participant’s samples 
are considered in order to get a main view of the cooperative tendencies in 
population. these studies may be considered as a guide to adopt a detailed 
approach latter. following hake and vukelich (1972) our studies may be con-
sidered in the category named choice procedures.
In short, we first expected that the task would allow classifying candidates, 
differentiating cooperative subjects and non cooperative subjects, regarding 
their specific mode to address their behavior. Secondly, far from a strategy for 
tracking up most points, we expected that the ability of puzzle-solving would 
not force candidates to cooperate. We also expected that cooperation as a 
behavioral tendency would show temporal stability after a long period of time. 
finally, we expected cooperative behavior to be sensitive to the cooperative 
tendency of the others.
stuDy 1
the goals of the present study are: (a) to investigate whether the puzzle-
solving task with a virtual partner is capable of stimulating the configuration 
of different cooperative behavior tendencies; (b) to study the distribution of 
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these tendencies and how they relate with gender; (c) to check whether the 
subject’s tendency to cooperate is consistent throughout the task; and (d) to 
test whether cooperative behavior is independent of the specific ability for 
solving puzzles.
methoD
Participants
a total of 713 university graduates, candidates for entering a preparatory 
course for a job with high status and good salary. the sample was made up of 
347 females (mean age 28.2), and 366 males (mean age 28.4).
Materials
the tasks were administered in a large room with individual workplaces con-
veniently separated. they were administered on Pc-compatible computers 
and Philips 107-s, 17” monitors.
Instruments
the task was presented in a computerized format. the screen was divided 
into two panels (figure 1), the upper panel corresponding to the candidate and 
the lower panel supposedly corresponding to another candidate (the partner), 
present in the same room. on the left side of each panel there was a frame 
with the participant’s puzzle pieces randomly distributed inside, and on the 
right an empty frame. each piece was to be moved to its correct place in the 
empty frame by tracking it with the mouse and releasing it in the right-hand 
frame. Participants could move their own and their partner’s puzzle pieces, 
and the partner could also move pieces in both puzzles. When a piece was 
moved to a wrong place the error was indicated by a sound, and the piece 
moved back automatically to its original place. When the piece was moved 
correctly, a different sound was made, and the piece remained in its place. 
Participants could see how the partner moved his/her pieces. There was a 
button labeled “continue”, which could be used to skip the puzzle if the subject 
had finished his/her own puzzle and did not wish to wait for his/her partner.
Participants were told that the task consisted in completing the puzzle 
quickly, gaining as many points as possible in the shortest time. however, 
subject’s and partner’s scores were linked, in an attempt to make the partici-
pant understand that cooperation could be beneficial. Specifically, the partici-
pant was informed about the following rules for gaining points:
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•	 If the participant moved a piece correctly in his/her own puzzle, +1 point for s/he.
•	 If the participant moved a piece correctly in his/her partner’s puzzle, +1 point for 
s/he and for the partner.
•	 If the participant moved a piece to a wrong place in his/her own puzzle, -1 point.
•	 If the participant moved a piece to a wrong place in his/her partner’s puzzle, -1 
point for s/he and for the partner.
Figure 1. Organization of the screen during the task. In the panel above, 
the participant’s puzzle; in the panel below, the partner’s puzzle.
this scoring system served to foster the participant’s predisposition to 
cooperate while suggesting that a good performance in one’s own puzzle also 
leads to gaining points. this procedure would not be useful if there were only 
one position available, as in that case would be a non-sense to put pieces in 
the partner’s puzzle. however, the fact that there were many positions avail-
able makes a reasonable decision to put pieces in the partner’s puzzle, as 
it scores on the own puzzle although also serves to the partner’s goal. the 
virtual partner was programmed to cooperate with the subject at a few fixed 
moments throughout the task if the participant did no cooperate at all. how-
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ever, once the participant cooperates, the virtual partner essentially mimicked 
the participant’s behavior.
a critical aspect of the task is that it assesses the subject’s predisposition 
to cooperate, but this should be independent of his/her puzzle-solving ability. 
the test is presented as one of ability for puzzle-solving in which performance 
is the key to pass. in that way, the real goal (propensity to cooperate) is hid-
den. so, it is important to remove from the measurement procedure any con-
tamination from the puzzle-solving ability. this can be done making the task 
easy to solve and incorporating training trials to the experimental session.
Procedure 
the puzzle task was used in the selection process of candidates for taking the 
course, together with other tests of personality and cognitive abilities. each 
participant solved four puzzles with pictures of natural landscapes. they had 
a maximum total time of 10 minutes for solving them.
We defined two indices, one for assessing the tendency to cooperate and 
the other for assessing the efficiency in puzzle solving. The index of coopera-
tion was calculated with the following equation:
EA
A
HH
H
C
+
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where ha and he stand for the number of Hits in one’s own puzzle (Ego) and 
in the partner’s puzzle (Alter). as is obvious from its structure, the C index re-
flects the degree to which participants share their hits with the partner. A par-
ticipant that never cooperates with the partner will have c = 0. a systematic 
cooperator, that is, a participant that always shares hits with the partner, will 
have a .50 value. Intermediate values reflect different degrees of cooperation 
during the task, rather than a systematic way of facing it. Values significantly 
higher than .50 would be considered as reflecting a “perverse behavior”, be-
cause it would indicate that the participant is checking the correct place by 
using the partner’s panel. the index of efficiency was calculated with the fol-
lowing equation:
( ) ( )
T
FFHH
E AEAE
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where he and ha mean the same as above, fe and fa stand for the number 
of Failures (wrong movements) in each puzzle, respectively, and t is the time 
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taken to finish the puzzle, in seconds. Index E increases as hit rate increases, 
and failure rate decreases, but is modulated by time. thus, if two participants 
have the same number of hits and failures, the one that finishes the puzzle in 
the shortest time has a higher E value. Both indexes were calculated for each 
puzzle of each candidate.
results
As there was an unexpectedly high number of subjects that did not finish the 
fourth puzzle before the maximum 10-minutes period allowed, the data from 
this puzzle were excluded from the analyses. A first look at the results of the 
other three puzzles suggests that the data from puzzle 1 were different from 
those of the other puzzles. the suspicion that puzzle 1 may have served as 
practice and that the behavior was not yet stabilized, led us to analyze the 
scores of the C index in the first three puzzles with a within-subjects ANOVA 
with three levels (the first three puzzles). We found a significant effect of the 
factor [f(2,1424) = 50.809; p < .001]. Post hoc comparisons with the Bonfer-
roni test showed that mean score in cooperation in puzzle 1 was significantly 
lower than in the other two (p < .001 in both cases), while the difference be-
tween the mean scores of puzzles 2 and 3 was not statistically significant (p = 
.149). We therefore decided to consider puzzle 1 as a warm up necessary to 
stabilize the behavior, and its results were excluded for the rest of the analy-
ses, for which only the data from puzzles 2 and 3 were employed.
the correlation between the C scores in puzzles 2 and 3 is .89 (p < .001), 
and the cronbach’s alpha, considering them as two items is .94; as we have 
already pointed out, the mean difference in C for puzzles 2 and 3 is not statis-
tically significant [t(712) = 1.444; p = .149]. In short, the cooperative behavior 
was very stable after puzzle 1.
figure 2 shows the distribution of scores of the C values. We expected to 
find three different tendencies of cooperation: (a) those that never cooperate, 
with c = 0; (b) those with a systematic sharing of hits, with c values close 
to .50; and (c) those with some intermediate value that does not reflect an 
extreme strategy, but a degree of cooperation. notice that a systematic co-
operator will not necessarily have a value exactly equal to .50, since the task 
may finish after one piece being correctly moved but before it is shared with 
the partner, or the reverse. this wide distribution of the cooperative behavior 
allows us to state that the setting does not guide the subjects in a specific 
path, facilitating either cooperation or not cooperation, as prescribes previous 
research in social behavior.
In practical terms, we have classified participants in the three groups ac-
cording to the following criteria:
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non-cooperation (nc):   ci = 0
graded cooperation (gc):  0 < ci ≤ .45
systematic cooperation (sc): ci > .45
Once classified according to these criteria, we found that the distribution of 
the tendencies is very close to 25% for each systematic attitude and to 50% for 
the gc. as expected, the graphic representation shows a three-peak distribu-
tion, two of them in the values 0 and .5, corresponding to the systematic strate-
gies of non-cooperation and systematic cooperation, and the third one around 
the .25 value, the intermediate value between 0 and .50 (see figure 2).
Figure 2. Distribution of C scores in study 1.
When crossed with gender, we found that the distribution is not indepen-
dent of it [χ2(2) = 8.838; p = .012]. data in table 1 show that this is due to the 
fact that the non-cooperation style is more frequent in females than system-
atic cooperation, while the opposite occurs in males. the correlation between 
cooperation and efficiency, as measured by C and E, is statistically significant 
(.435; p < .001).
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Discussion
all of the cooperation strategies described in the literature appear in a task 
designed to allow participants to show their propensity to cooperate with a 
competitor. Both suleiman and Rapoport (1992) and Weimann (1994) sug-
gested that there are three types of player. the task they used is also suitable 
for the study of this behavior, as participants show the same three tendencies. 
the tendencies are distributed non-uniformly, with about 25% of participants 
in each of the systematic styles and around 50% in the gc style. however, 
the distribution is different according to gender. systematic non-cooperation 
is more frequent than systematic cooperation in females, while the opposite is 
the case in males. nevertheless, participants present high levels of consisten-
cy throughout the task, as behavior does not change between the puzzles.
Unexpectedly, we found a moderate but significant correlation of coop-
eration with the efficiency index. We believe that this coefficient is artificially 
inflated by the way E was constructed. in the formula of E it is clear that for 
a given level of efficiency a subject that shares hits will have a higher E, as 
ha and he combine separately in the numerator. consequently, E and C must 
covariate significantly. We have defined another index that takes this in ac-
count, defined as
( )
T
FFH
E AEE
+−='
The correlation of cooperation with efficiency, as measured by E’, is dra-
matically reduced (.131; p < .001). nevertheless, we do not know the degree to 
which this index of efficiency is contaminated by the fact that it is derived from a 
situation open to cooperation. a cooperator candidate, for example, will expend 
Table 1. Percentages of participants showing each of the interactive 
styles, conditionalized to gender, in studies 1, 2, and 3 (NC, non-cooperation; 
GC, graded cooperation; SC, systematic cooperation; see text).
cooPeRative style
nc gc sc
study 1 Males 19.7 51.6 28.7 n=366females 26.8 52.7 20.5 n=347
study 2 Males 15.4 64.8 19.8 n=999females 22.7 60.6 16.7 n=999
study 3 Males 13.5 64.8 21.7 n=355females 21.4 57.2 21.4 n=271
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time when sharing hits. His/her efficiency, as measured by E’, will decrease as 
compared to a non-cooperator subject. We need a measure of puzzle-solving 
efficiency that is completely independent of any tendency of participants to 
present cooperative behaviors. this was one of our goals in study 2.
stuDy 2
as we have already pointed out in the discussion above, it is important to 
have a measure of the ability for the specific task employed, independent of 
the tendency to cooperate. the present study has two main goals: (1) to pro-
vide an independent measure of the task ability and explore its relationship 
with the tendency to cooperate, and (2) to study temporal stability after one 
year. We also slightly modified some aspects of the task in order to fix it ac-
cording to the results of study 1. the main change is that in the fourth puzzle 
there is no partner; the lower panel is empty. Responses in this last puzzle 
are intended to assess puzzle-solving ability with no contamination from the 
presence of a partner situation.
methoD
Participants
they were 1998 university graduates, candidates for taking the same course 
as in study 1; the selection process took place one year after that of study 1. 
a total of 381 individuals participated in both studies (studies 1 and 2). the 
sample was made up of 999 females (mean age 27.7), and 999 males (mean 
age 28.2).
Materials
the same as in study 1.
Instruments
the task was the same as in study 1 with the following exceptions. We se-
lected a simpler image (a cartoon) for puzzle 1, as it was definitively consid-
ered as practice with the task and its data were not included in the analysis. 
Puzzle 4 was presented without a partner, with only the upper panel of figure 
1. Before the presentation of the puzzle a message was displayed indicating 
that connection with the partner’s computer was impossible, and that the par-
ticipant could only work on his/her own puzzle.
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Procedure
the same as in study 1.
Figure 3. Distribution of C scores in study 2.
results anD Discussion
correlation between the C scores in puzzles 2 and 3 was .83 (p < .001) and 
cronbach’s alpha is .91, values very similar to those of study 1. the difference 
between the mean values of C for puzzles 2 and 3 was statistically significant 
[t(1997) = 6.888, p < .001]; that is, participants were more cooperative in the 
third than in the second puzzle, though the difference is very small (effect 
size, d = .09).
figure 3 shows that the distribution of scores of the C values had the 
same shape as that of study 1. there are again three different groups. once 
classified according to the same criteria as in study 1, the distribution of these 
styles is very similar. When crossed with gender, the distribution is not inde-
pendent of it [χ2(2) = 18.029, p < .001]. table 1 shows that the reason is the 
same as in study 1: non-cooperation behavior is more frequent than sys-
tematic cooperation in females, whereas systematic cooperation behavior is 
more frequent than non-cooperation in males.
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The correlation coefficients between C and the two indexes of efficiency, 
E and E’, are .482 (p < .001) and .109 (p < .001), respectively, values that are 
also very close to those of study 1. Taking the new measure of efficiency, that 
is, efficiency in the fourth puzzle (without a partner), the correlation with the 
index of cooperation is .125 (p < .001). It is significant because of the large 
sample used, but it is not relevant, since it accounts for only 1.5% of the vari-
ance. Notice that when there is no partner the efficiency scores are identical, 
taking either E or E’.
Stability of the tendency to cooperate. the correlation between the coop-
eration index values of the two applications could be calculated for 381 indi-
viduals that participated in both selection processes. The coefficient equals 
.404 (p < .001). table 2 shows the contingencies between the types of coop-
eration in the two applications. 54.4% of the participants are classified in the 
same category, while most changes are shifts to a higher degree of coopera-
tion (from nc to gc or from gc to sc).
the stability is reasonably high, taking into account that there is a one-
year interval between the applications. furthermore, as the sample is com-
posed by candidates that did not pass the first selection process, it is conceiv-
able that in the second application some of them were suspicious of the real 
goal of the test and moved to a more cooperative strategy.
Table 2. Percentages of participants showing each combination of the 
interactive styles in the first and second applications of study 2 (NC, non-co-
operation; GC, graded cooperation; SC, systematic cooperation; see text).
second
nc gc sc
                  nc 6.3 13.6 3.9 n=91
first           gc 3.7 33.1 14.7 n=196
                  sc 0.8 8.9 15.0 n=94
n=41 n=212 n=128
stuDy 3
one of the conclusions from reviews of research with Pd is that the behavior 
of the participants in iterated versions is sensible to the behavior of the others 
(e.g., au & Komorita, 2002; Monterosso, ainslie, Mullen & gault, 2002). it has 
also been showed that a “best strategy” as such cannot be defined without 
taking in account the type of competitors in the population that provides the 
context (alexander, 1974). the goal of the present study was to check wheth-
er the puzzle task is also sensible to the behavior of the partner. a sample of 
participants faced the task two times. The first one was identical to the version 
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of study 2, whereas in the second one the partner could show any of the three 
cooperation styles found in previous studies. We will test whether the behav-
ior of the candidates changes when that of partner changes.
 methoD
Participants
they were 626 fresh candidates from the same pool as those from study 2. 
the sample was made up of 271 females (mean age 27.9), and 355 males 
(mean age 28.8).
Materials
the same as in study 2.
Instruments
Participants took two versions of the task. The first one was exactly the same 
as in study 2. that is, the partner showed a pattern of behavior that essen-
tially mimicked the degree of cooperation of the candidate. in the second one 
the behavior of the virtual partner did not change according to the behavior 
of the participant. It was fixed following one of the three patterns previously 
described (nc, gc, and sc). Participants were randomly distributed between 
the three conditions before running the first version of the task; that is, before 
knowing his/her tendency to cooperate with the task.
Procedure
The first version of the puzzle task was applied, as in study 2, together with 
other personality and cognitive abilities measures and in the same order. the 
second version was administered at the end of the session, about one hour 
after the other.
results
We first checked that the results from the first application were similar to those 
of the previous studies. furthermore, as we did not know the pattern of behavior 
of the participants before being assigned to an experimental group, we expected 
also a good distribution between the groups. table 3 shows the subsamples 
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generated with this blind procedure. the marginals show that the behavioral 
tendencies have a distribution close to that of previous studies and that their dis-
tributions over the experimental groups is homogeneous [χ2(4) = 4.32, p = .37].
as in our previous studies, the distribution of tendency to cooperate is 
not independent of gender [χ2(2) = 7.08, p < .03]. data in table 1 show again 
that this is due mainly to a higher frequency of females in the non-cooperation 
category.
Table 3. Frequencies of the three patterns of behavior in the first appli-
cation of the task in study 3, and their assignment to the three experimental 
conditions for the second application (style of the virtual partner).
style of virtual partner in the 
second application
nc gc sc
style showed in the 
first application
nc 39 35 32 106 (16.9%)
gc 130 129 126 385 (61.5%)
sc 53 33 49 135 (21.6%)
222
(35.5%)
197
(31.5%)
207
(33.1%)
Table 4. Joint frequencies of the patterns of behavior showed in both ap-
plications of the task, conditionalized to the style of the virtual partner in the 
second application (experimental group).
experimental 
group
second aPPlication
nc gc sc
fiRst 
aPPlication
nc
nc 66.7 33.3 0
gc 65.7 34.3 0
sc 53.1 40.6 6.3
gc
nc 10.0 89.2 0.8
gc 7.8 86.8 5.4
sc 2.4 76.2 21.4
sc
nc 1.9 75.5 22.6
gc 0 69.7 30.3
sc 0 14.3 85.7
table 4 shows the contingency between the propensity to cooperate 
showed in both applications, conditionalized to the tendency to cooperate of 
the virtual partner (experimental group). statistical tests show that the distri-
bution of patterns of cooperation changes significantly with the style of the vir-
tual partner when the pattern of the participant in the first application was that 
of graded cooperation [χ2(4) = 40.15, p < .001] or systematic cooperation 
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[χ2(4) = 46.67, p < .001], but not when it was non- cooperation [χ2(4) = 5.54, 
p < .24]. the biggest change is produced in participants that were systematic 
Cooperators in the first application. If their partner in the second application is 
not now a systematic cooperator most of them reduce their degree of coop-
eration to the gc or even to the nc level.
General Discussion
cooperation has been a major point in the study of social behavior. during 
the last several decades, some experimental settings have been developed, 
studying minimal social settings configured by two participants in interaction. 
In this paper we argue that these preparations are quite artificial and that the 
approximation to study cooperation from an operant perspective is too restric-
tive.
We think that these problems are solved through the task developed by 
Ribes-iñesta (2001) and Ribes-iñesta and Rangel (2002). in their studies, 
they use a computerized behavioral task consisting to solving puzzles. this 
is a more naturalistic setting than those used previously. Moreover, different 
from tradition in study of cooperation, there is not a common criterion to be 
reached for both subjects to consider that a cooperation event has occurred. 
each subject can choose between cooperate or not with the other, indepen-
dently of the partner’s behavior, even when the benefits are mutual under 
cooperative contingencies.
in this experimental preparation children can choose between a dual-puz-
zle and a single-puzzle version of the task. the dual-puzzle version includes 
different sub-versions in which the behavior of each participant can influence 
the performance of the others (as in our task) in competitive or non-competi-
tive settings, or in which the children can simply help their partner. the chil-
dren preferred the individual version, where they do not have to make deci-
sions about cooperative behavior. nevertheless, their very choice of version 
reflects their preferences. Even when they were initially exposed to the forced 
cooperation and sharing condition, in which they could learn the benefits of 
mutual cooperation, most children choose to solve the puzzle individually.
We use in our three studies an experimental situation developed from 
previous work of Ribes-iñesta et al. different from these studies, when huge 
samples of participants are considered, cooperative behavior is observed, 
but a tendency to not cooperate is the main option yet. nevertheless, the 
three different modes to address behavior defined, non-cooperation, graded 
cooperation and systematic cooperation, could be observed in significant pro-
portions.
the studies show that the participants were quite consistent throughout 
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the task and reasonably stable after a one-year interval between applications. 
the former permits to conclude that in spite of the setting used, when the 
participants can choose between cooperate or not, their specific tendency 
will be observed. But, as we analyze after, participant’s cooperative tendency 
is influenced by the partner (see study 3), so that consistency is modulated 
by specific properties of the setting used. Moreover, participants were stable 
in their behavior when a test-retest study was done. Both, consistency and 
stability, permit to address future studies in which the analysis of participant’s 
specific behavioral patterns will be considered.
We may conclude that we have a suitable naturalistic task for the study 
of social behavior, where contingencies do not prescribe any specific path in 
social interaction. the participants can choose how to behave with the others, 
and so, we can access to their specific behavioral tendencies under social 
contingencies.
We believe that this experimental preparation can be used to study in 
general social behavior, under cooperative, competitive or even exchange 
contingencies. in this sense, it is clear that more research is necessary using 
this type of natural settings.
one obvious advantage of this kind of tasks is that the assessment of 
cooperation is realized from the analysis of real behavior in situations that are 
not strange to the subjects. so, we have a direct assessment of subject’s be-
havioral tendencies, in spite of other possible assessment procedures based 
on verbal communications. as we can conclude from the three studies, sub-
jects are not only consistent and stable in their personal communications. 
they are consistent and stable in their behavior, too.
 as well as it has been widely found that females are more altruistic 
than males there is contradictory evidence of the effect of gender on coop-
eration. Kurzban and houser (2001) found that males were more likely to be 
strong cooperators than females. our data also have shown that females 
display a higher frequency of non-cooperative styles and males show a higher 
frequency of systematic cooperation. it is possible that previous results are 
caused from the artificial paradigms used to study social behavior or, per-
haps, that the natural setting used in our study is more sensible to extreme 
tendency of the cooperative behavior continuum. More research is necessary 
to validate evidence observed in our research.
We also found that the tendency to cooperate is essentially independent of 
the ability to solve the puzzles. it could be argued that people would be prone 
to cooperate the higher their ability for the task, as less able people would be 
more concerned with doing the task properly, so that they spend more time on 
the procedures involved in solving the puzzles than thinking about whether to 
cooperate. Our results show a significant correlation between cooperation and 
problem-solving ability, but only as a consequence of the very large sample 
Juan Botella, et al280
employed; in fact, the percentage of variance accounted for is less than 2%.
In the version of the task employed in studies 1 and 2 and in the first 
application of study 3 the simulated partner has been programmed to be-
have in exactly the same way for all participants. study 3 showed that the 
participant’s tendency to cooperate (real persons) is sensible to the partner’s 
behavior (simulated partner), so that it can be considered as part of the con-
text (axelrod, 1984). these results show that in the study of social behavior 
the partner’s behavior is an essential cue, so that participants adjust their 
behavior to other possible participants implicated in the same context. if the 
partner behaves in a collaborative way then it is possible that the participants 
equal this specific mode of behavior, shadowing their real tendency to cooper-
ate or not. once again, using of naturalistic situation in which the participant 
may choose between cooperate or not, independently of the behavior of the 
others, is a necessary requirement for the study of social behavior.
When gains and losses are included in the same task, different behavior 
responses can be expected. although merely at a speculative level, we might 
see cooperative behavior as sensitive to the way the person interprets the 
positive or negative results of cooperation. some participants may interpret 
the cooperative option as better in the long term. our three-mode distribution 
reflects, in fact, three different ways in which cooperative behavior may take 
place. the competitive situation of a selection process may contribute making 
participants to look at it as a potential danger, or as an opportunity to obtain 
the most benefit from it. It would be interesting to explore collaborative behav-
ior using other contexts and task configurations.
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